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same period, the u.s. increased its share by 0.7
percentage points and japan by 5.4 percentage
points. The EC's loss of market share is particu-
larly troubling because the loss occurred in
sectors where world demand has been growing
most rapidly, such as electronics and information
technology. The accompanying charts illustrate
the EC's less favorable economic performance
compared to that of the U.S.and japan in the last
decade.
The European Community (EC) was established
in 1957 with high expectations that a common
market would bring lasting economic prosperity
to Europe. However, the EC has had difficulties
living up to its promise. In recent years the EC
countries have experienced lagging income
growth, high unemployment, and a diminished
ability to compete with the u.s. and japan in
high technology sectors. The stagnation of Eu-
rope compared to the u.s. and japan, termed
"Eurosclerosis;' prompted European policy
makers to accelerate the unification of the Euro-
pean market as a way of competing more effec-
tively with the other industrial economic powers.
In recent months, policy makers have approved
measures that would, by 1992, liberalize capital
flows, develop a compatible payments system,
and permit the issuance of a single European
banking license. These measures have attracted
considerable attention and prompted a flurry of
mergers and acquisitions within the ECin antic-
ipation of 1992. This Letter reviews the plan for a
united European market, its implications, and the
prospects for its achievement. As a solution to
the problem of economic stagnation and dimin-
ished European competitiveness, this plan may
























The economic performance of Europe began
deteriorating compared to that of japan and the
United States in the late 1970s. Since 1979,
growth in the u.s. and japan has outpaced that
in the EC by an average of 0.5 and 2.1 percent-
age points a year, respectively. Unemployment in
Europe has remained above 10.5 percent in the
last five years, despite government programs de-
signed to create jobs and retrain unemployed
workers. Efforts to increase competitiveness in
high technology sectors have met with little suc-
cess, as the EC lost 1.4 percentage points of its
market share in industrial exports to all OECD
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-














Contractionary macroeconomic policies partly
explain Europe's unfavorable economic perform-
ance and high unemployment in recent years. In
particular, the major EC countries generally fol-
lowed tight fiscal and monetary policies in the
1980s. Nonetheless, it is hard to attribute the
prolonged stagnation of the EC economies to
tight macroeconomic policies since similar
policies were pursued in Japan.
Two other factors have played a major role in
the poorer performance of the EC economies.
The first is economic policies in EC countries that
inhibit competition by reducing innovation and
the incentive for firms to respond to market
forces. Restrictive labor market practices that
affect firms' abilities to hire and fire workers,
as well as high bankruptcy costs, discourage
risk~taking and the entry of new firms into the
market, particularly the small entrepreneurial
companies that frequently provide innovation in
high technology and many new jobs. Govern-
ment subsidies that typically benefit large and
established firms and/or inefficient nationalized
industries exacerbate this bias against competi~
tion and small companies. Also, significant
barriers to external trade, including import
quotas on cars, textiles, footwear, and electronics
discourage competitiveness.
The second factor that has hurt the EC is setbacks
to economic integration. The energy crisis and
disruptions in the international monetary system
in the 1970s prompted EC members to look after
their national interests and to erect or reintro-
duce a variety of non-tariff trade barriers, includ-
ing production quotas, subsidies to domestic
firms, and cumbersome administrative proce-
dures. By limiting the size of the markets within
which European firms could operate, these meas-
ures may have contributed to Europe's lagging
performance in recent years.
By the first half of the 1980s European policy
makers were aware that they were losing ground
to their main industrial country competitors. As
a result, these policy makers sought to improve
economic performance by accelerating the es-
tablishment of a truly unified European market.
Unification, they assumed, also would improve
the competitiveness of European firms.
The plan
In June 1985, EC members adopted a White
Paper outlining an ambitious plan to create a
fully integrated internal European market by
1992. The White Paper contains 300 directives
for dismantling barriers to flows of goods, serv-
ices, capital, and labor, and a timetable for
accomplishing each. It covers four main areas:
merchandise, services, capital, and mobility of
professionals.
With respect to removing barriers to merchan-
dise trade, the 1992 plan would eliminate a
number of government subsidies and production
quotas, and harmonize value-added taxes within
the EC. By 1992, legislation establishing uniform
safety and performance standards would permit
goods satisfying these standards to be marketed
freely throughout the Community. Border con-
trols, which delay intracommunity shipments,
also would be eliminated.
To remove barriers to services trade, banks would
be granted a single European license, and banks
already authorized to operate in one EC country
would be permitted to open branches freely in
other EC countries. Barriers to cross-border
marketing of other financial services such as
insurance also would be abolished. Trade in non-
financial services would be stimulated by allow-
ing open competition throughout the EC for most
public works and supplies contracts.
Existing controls on financial transactions be-
tween member states would be repealed by 1992
to enhance capital mobility within the EC. Resi-
dents of any EC country would be able to open
bank accounts in any other member country.
Cross-border corporate mergers and acquisitions
also would be facilitated.
Finally, the 1992 plan provides for enhanced
mobility of professionals. University degrees and
vocational training certificates would be mutu-
ally recognized, thereby enabling accountants,
teachers, and other professionals to engage freely
in their professions throughout the EC.
The White Paper was well received bythe Euro-
pean Council of Finance Ministers, which has
agreed to reach a legislative consensus on each
directive before 1992. Seventy of the 300 direc-
tives proposed in the White Paper have been
approved so far, and the Council expects to
adopt 50 more in 1988.The benefits expected from these measures are
substantial. A study by the Commission of the
European Communities estimates that if fully
implemented, the 1992 program may double
Europe's annual growth to four percent. The dis-
mantling of internal trade barriers and the inte-
gration of capital markets wiII lower the cost of
goods and capital within the EC, and promote
more efficient allocation of resources. Europe will
have the largest consumer market in the world by
1992, permitting firms to exploit economies of
scale. Harmonizing safety and performance stan-
dards will further enhance efficiency. Research
and development most likely will be spurred by
increased competitive pressure and the changes
in marketing strategy necessary to appeal to a
market of 320 million consumers. These benefits
will enable companies to lower prices, increase
employment, and expand investment, setting the
stage for faster economic growth.
Uncertainties
Although the progress that alreadyhas been
made towards a united Europe is significant,
skeptics question whether key directives in the
White Paper will be rapidly and fully enacted. It
has taken the Council three years to approve less
than one third of the proposed directives, and
there are major obstacles to approving a number
of the remaining directives. For example, there
has been no progress in eliminating some of the
most glaring internal EC quotas and subsidies in
agriculture, steel, and textiles.
Some EC members also are concerned that capi-
tal movements to other EC countries with lower
taxes and higher investment yields may cause
serious problems for exchange rate stability and
domestic monetary policy. This raises the addi-
tional question whether governments will be able
to pursue the convergent and non-inflationary
fiscal and monetary policies that are required to
guarantee the benefits and the stability of a uni-
fied market.
A more serious potential problem is that even if
the 1992 plan is fully implemented, the benefits
expected from a united Europe may not be real-
ized. The 1992 plan assumes that a larger market
will lead to greater competitiveness by lowering
the costs of production and distribution within
the EC. However, the plan does not tackle a
number of economic policies within the EC that
discourage competitiveness. For example, there
is no specific provision in the plan to prevent
governments from subsidizing their domestic
manufacturing and financial sectors. Such sub-
sidies could continue to insulate domestic bus-
inesses from competition even as other trade
barriers within the EC fall. Instead, the plan relies
on vigorous implementation of existing rules
against anti-competitive subsidies, even though
these safeguards have not been fully effective in
the past. There also are fears that Europe will
raise trade and finance barriers with the rest of
the world while it "gets organized." A rise in
such external trade barriers would further insu-
late European producers from competition.
The plan's failure to address these anti-compe-
titive policies directly will diminish the potential
benefits associated with economic integration.
Experience suggests integration and large domes-
tic markets are neither necessary nor sufficient
conditions for stimulating competitiveness and
growth. For example, the newly industrializing
countries of the Asia-Pacific Basin with access to
small domestic markets have proved formidable
competitors in world markets and have experi-
enced rapid economic growth. In contrast, many
Latin American economies with much larger do-
mestic markets have had difficulty competing
internationally and have experienced sluggish
economic growth, in part because of policies
which discourage competition.
These examples suggest that economicinte-
gration alone may not improve Europe's sluggish
economic performance. Other economic policies
that discourage competitiveness also need to be
changed. Otherwise, Eurosclerosis may persist,
even if substantial progress is made in achieving
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MONETARY POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR 1988
On July 13, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan presented a mid-year report to
the Congress on the Federal Reserve's monetary policy objectives for the remainder of 1988. The
report reviews economic and financial developments in 1988 and presents the economic out-
look heading into 1989. For single or multiple copies of the report, write to the Public
Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco,
CA 94120, or phone (415) 974-2246.
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